[SEE CAVEAT BELOW REGARDING THE REPUBLISHING OF THIS POST ON THE CORRECT DATE IN JANUARY]
After the near-disaster at Quilali, the Marines pursuing Sandino once again changed tactics and laid aside the plan to assault El Chipote with a combined infantry-air assault. Instead, aggressive patrolling would force the enemy to concentrate in the mountain redoubt, planes would destroy the fortress from the air, and the infantry would mop up the remaining resistance. This plan was feasible because the creaky old DeHavilands had been replaced by new Vought Corsairs and Curtiss Falcons, which had greater bomb-carrying capacities and were faster and more maneuverable. Major Rusty Rowell’s squadron subjected the shacks atop El Chipote to unrelenting bombardment.
On January 14 the airmen flew northeast from Managua through heavy cumulus clouds, their planes laden with 50-pound demolition and 17-pound fragmentation bombs. Luckily, “there was a nice hole in the clouds right over the bandit mountain.” On Rowell’s signal, the planes hurtled towards El Chipote in almost vertical dives. “They saw us coming,” Rowell recalled. “The first thing I saw was a barrage of sky rockets. Eight or ten of them rose in the sector that I was after.” In all, 2,800 rounds of machine-gun ammunition ripped into the hilltop, while four 50-pound and 18 17-pound bombs burst upon Sandino’s entrenchments. One of Rowell’s aviators scored a direct hit with a 50-pound bomb on a building. After the bomb burst, about 40 people ran from a nearby house and the plane dropped another bomb, making a direct hit in the center of the group. The aviators estimated that 45-50 bodies were scattered on the ground after the attack. Following the air assault, rumors of Sandino’s death received wide circulation. On January 19, Rowell flew over the mountain and saw nothing but “squadrons of vultures.”
However, much like the campaign to bomb Osama bin Laden out of Tora Bora 73 years later, the reliance on air power to kill a targeted individual would ultimately prove unsuccessful.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Monday, December 13, 2010
Interesting story in Newsweek on Israel's history of eliminating foreign weapons scientists.
Technically speaking, these killings were neither strategic manhunts or targeted killings/decapitation, but rather pure assassination. Roughly speaking, strategic manhunts involve the deployment of uniformed forces with the objective of capturing/killing one individual. Targeted killings/decapitation strategies involve killing a class of individuals during a time of war, i.e. the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, Israel's targeting of Hamas cell leaders during the Second Intifada, or U.S. targeting of al-Qa'ida in Iraq/Jaish al-Mahdi leadership in Iraq or Predator strikes against al-Qa'ida/Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Conversely, although assassinations are directed at individuals, unlike strategic manhunts by definition they exclude the possibility of capture. Additionally, whereas targeted killings use overt military force, the essence of assassination is its treacherous nature, which includes the use of violent force during peacetime by covert personnel.
But still, it is an interesting article, and demonstrates: a) how little Israel's strategic situation has improved in the last 50 years; and b) that existential threats to its security existed well before the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.
Technically speaking, these killings were neither strategic manhunts or targeted killings/decapitation, but rather pure assassination. Roughly speaking, strategic manhunts involve the deployment of uniformed forces with the objective of capturing/killing one individual. Targeted killings/decapitation strategies involve killing a class of individuals during a time of war, i.e. the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, Israel's targeting of Hamas cell leaders during the Second Intifada, or U.S. targeting of al-Qa'ida in Iraq/Jaish al-Mahdi leadership in Iraq or Predator strikes against al-Qa'ida/Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Conversely, although assassinations are directed at individuals, unlike strategic manhunts by definition they exclude the possibility of capture. Additionally, whereas targeted killings use overt military force, the essence of assassination is its treacherous nature, which includes the use of violent force during peacetime by covert personnel.
But still, it is an interesting article, and demonstrates: a) how little Israel's strategic situation has improved in the last 50 years; and b) that existential threats to its security existed well before the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.
Saturday, December 11, 2010
Today in Manhunting History -- January 11, 1886: The Death of Captain Emmet Crawford
A heavy fog sat upon Captain Emmet Crawford’s camp on the morning of January 11, 1886.
The day before, after a forced march of 48 hours through the mountain range known to Mexicans as “Espina del Diablo,” or “Backbone of the Devil, Crawford and the 100 Apache scouts he led had surprised Geronimo and his warriors at their camp along the Aros River, 150 miles south of the U.S. border. Just before daylight his detachment attacked and drove Geronimo’s followers from their rancheria. The capture of Geronimo’s supplies was a terrible blow in the harsh winter conditions of the Sierra Madres, and toward the middle of the afternoon, a squaw came into the camp and said that Geronimo and his followers were camped a few miles away and wished to talk to Crawford about surrendering. Crawford agreed to meet with Geronimo, and everyone in the American camp seemed to collectively exhale, believing the Geronimo campaign was about to end.
Six-foot-one, with gray eyes, a fellow officer described Crawford, saying: “Mentally, morally, and physically he would have been an ideal knight of King Arthur’s Court.” The Apaches alternately called him “Tall Chief” because of his height, and “Captain Coffee” because of his apparent addiction to the beverage. When reenlisting scouts in October and November for the expedition, Crawford chose only White Mountain and friendly Chiricahua Apaches – mountain Indians whom he knew were ideally suited for the arduous task of trailing Geronimo in the difficult Sierra Madres. These Indians joined the expedition not only because they hated the renegades, but also because they trusted Crawford, who was known for his concern for the scouts serving under him.
Just as the light of dawn made the terrain around Crawford’s camp visible on the 11th, the sentries reported a large body of troops approaching. One scout, believing the oncoming party to be Major Wirt Davis and his scouts, called to the approaching force in Apache.
But they were not Apache scouts.
At the sound of Apache voices, the force of 150 Mexican irregulars opened fire on Crawford’s camp. Bullets hissed through the air, driving the officers and scouts into the rocks for cover. Crawford ordered his men to hold their fire while he and the other officers shouted in Spanish, identifying themselves as American soldiers and waving handkerchiefs. After about 15 minutes there was a lull in the shooting. Crawford climbed atop a prominent rock in plain view of the Mexicans. Although his blue field uniform was in tatters, his brown beard ensured that he looked nothing like an Apache. Waving a handkerchief in each hand, he shouted: “No tiro! No tiro! Soldados Americanos!”
Twenty-five yards away, across a small ravine, a Mexican steadied his rifle against a pine tree and took aim. A shot rang out. Lieutenant Marion P. Maus, Crawford’s second-in-command, turned and “saw the Captain lying on the rocks with a wound in his head, and some of his brains lying upon the rocks.”
Enraged, the immediately unleashed a furious fire upon the Nacionales. The battle raged for an hour as the Apaches and Mexicans blazed away at one another, while Crawford lay bleeding in the no-man’s-land between the combatants. Finally, the Mexicans raised their own white flag. Four on the American side were wounded, while the scouts killed four Mexicans and wounded five others. Crawford lingered in a coma for seven excruciating days, finally dying on January 18. General George Crook maintained that had Crawford lived, the Apache War would have ended there beside the Aros River in January 1886.
On a hillside across the river, the renegades sat and watched the battle rage. A member of the band still recalled 70 years later how “Geronimo watched it and laughed.”
The day before, after a forced march of 48 hours through the mountain range known to Mexicans as “Espina del Diablo,” or “Backbone of the Devil, Crawford and the 100 Apache scouts he led had surprised Geronimo and his warriors at their camp along the Aros River, 150 miles south of the U.S. border. Just before daylight his detachment attacked and drove Geronimo’s followers from their rancheria. The capture of Geronimo’s supplies was a terrible blow in the harsh winter conditions of the Sierra Madres, and toward the middle of the afternoon, a squaw came into the camp and said that Geronimo and his followers were camped a few miles away and wished to talk to Crawford about surrendering. Crawford agreed to meet with Geronimo, and everyone in the American camp seemed to collectively exhale, believing the Geronimo campaign was about to end.
Six-foot-one, with gray eyes, a fellow officer described Crawford, saying: “Mentally, morally, and physically he would have been an ideal knight of King Arthur’s Court.” The Apaches alternately called him “Tall Chief” because of his height, and “Captain Coffee” because of his apparent addiction to the beverage. When reenlisting scouts in October and November for the expedition, Crawford chose only White Mountain and friendly Chiricahua Apaches – mountain Indians whom he knew were ideally suited for the arduous task of trailing Geronimo in the difficult Sierra Madres. These Indians joined the expedition not only because they hated the renegades, but also because they trusted Crawford, who was known for his concern for the scouts serving under him.
Just as the light of dawn made the terrain around Crawford’s camp visible on the 11th, the sentries reported a large body of troops approaching. One scout, believing the oncoming party to be Major Wirt Davis and his scouts, called to the approaching force in Apache.
But they were not Apache scouts.
At the sound of Apache voices, the force of 150 Mexican irregulars opened fire on Crawford’s camp. Bullets hissed through the air, driving the officers and scouts into the rocks for cover. Crawford ordered his men to hold their fire while he and the other officers shouted in Spanish, identifying themselves as American soldiers and waving handkerchiefs. After about 15 minutes there was a lull in the shooting. Crawford climbed atop a prominent rock in plain view of the Mexicans. Although his blue field uniform was in tatters, his brown beard ensured that he looked nothing like an Apache. Waving a handkerchief in each hand, he shouted: “No tiro! No tiro! Soldados Americanos!”
Twenty-five yards away, across a small ravine, a Mexican steadied his rifle against a pine tree and took aim. A shot rang out. Lieutenant Marion P. Maus, Crawford’s second-in-command, turned and “saw the Captain lying on the rocks with a wound in his head, and some of his brains lying upon the rocks.”
Enraged, the immediately unleashed a furious fire upon the Nacionales. The battle raged for an hour as the Apaches and Mexicans blazed away at one another, while Crawford lay bleeding in the no-man’s-land between the combatants. Finally, the Mexicans raised their own white flag. Four on the American side were wounded, while the scouts killed four Mexicans and wounded five others. Crawford lingered in a coma for seven excruciating days, finally dying on January 18. General George Crook maintained that had Crawford lived, the Apache War would have ended there beside the Aros River in January 1886.
On a hillside across the river, the renegades sat and watched the battle rage. A member of the band still recalled 70 years later how “Geronimo watched it and laughed.”
Friday, December 10, 2010
Today in Manhunting History -- January 10, 1916: Massacre at Santa Ysabel
On January 10, 1916, forces belonging to Mexican revolutionary/bandit Pancho Villa stopped a train of the Mexican North Western Railway Company near Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua. They dragged 17 American miners off the train, and amid cries of “Viva Villa,” they stripped and shot the Americans in cold blood. According to Woodrow Wilson's biographer Arthur S. Link, news of the massacre “set off violent agitation in Congress,” and a “wild anger and excitement greater than any since the sinking of the Lusitania surged through part of the American people.”
Despite calls for retaliation, the Wilson administration insisted it was an internal matter for Mexican President Venustiano Carranza to deal with. Less than two months later, however, Villa's next attack would make him the target of a U.S. strategic manhunt.
Despite calls for retaliation, the Wilson administration insisted it was an internal matter for Mexican President Venustiano Carranza to deal with. Less than two months later, however, Villa's next attack would make him the target of a U.S. strategic manhunt.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Yon on the Danger of Social Networking
Michael Yon on how social networking can make you easy to target. (Or as Glenn Reynolds titles his link, "How to Get Tracked Down and Killed."
Unfortunately, the targets of most recent U.S. strategic manhunts have already learned this lesson. Bin Laden’s “voice-print” was on file in the NSA’s massive computers, and satellites scanned cellular and satellite phone calls originating from Afghanistan in the 1990s for a match. Yet these technologies were rendered useless when bin Laden stopped using these devices in 1998, relying exclusively on face-to-face meetings and couriers to transmit orders to his minions.
Saddam and his sons were extremely careful not to use phones or other communications equipment that might give their positions away. Other than the single phone call intercepted during the raid that killed his sons, there were reportedly few, if any, direct intercepts of Saddam available. Similarly, Zarqawi “knew well how much the Americans relied on high technology to track down suspects: he and his men refrained from using cell phones, knowing how easily they could be tracked.”
Even Pablo Escobar warned his son "Stay away from the phone. The phone is death," advice he ignored himself to his detriment.
Unfortunately, the targets of most recent U.S. strategic manhunts have already learned this lesson. Bin Laden’s “voice-print” was on file in the NSA’s massive computers, and satellites scanned cellular and satellite phone calls originating from Afghanistan in the 1990s for a match. Yet these technologies were rendered useless when bin Laden stopped using these devices in 1998, relying exclusively on face-to-face meetings and couriers to transmit orders to his minions.
Saddam and his sons were extremely careful not to use phones or other communications equipment that might give their positions away. Other than the single phone call intercepted during the raid that killed his sons, there were reportedly few, if any, direct intercepts of Saddam available. Similarly, Zarqawi “knew well how much the Americans relied on high technology to track down suspects: he and his men refrained from using cell phones, knowing how easily they could be tracked.”
Even Pablo Escobar warned his son "Stay away from the phone. The phone is death," advice he ignored himself to his detriment.
David Bosco on Targeted Killings
Two pieces by my friend David Bosco on the implications of targeted killings over at his Foreign Policy blog "The Multilateralist." (David wrote an excellent book on the history of the UN Security Council, Five to Rule Them All, so has a longstanding interest in these issues).
Normally, I am skeptical about attempts to restrain the struggle against al Qa'ida through litigation or the articulation of international norms that states will just ignore at their convenience. But David raises some interesting points about how the United States will respond if a foreign power someday decides to target somebody they have designated as a terrorist on U.S. soil.
Normally, I am skeptical about attempts to restrain the struggle against al Qa'ida through litigation or the articulation of international norms that states will just ignore at their convenience. But David raises some interesting points about how the United States will respond if a foreign power someday decides to target somebody they have designated as a terrorist on U.S. soil.
SOF Deals Blow to Taliban Ranks
The invaluable Bill Roggio on special operations raids in Afghanistan. Roggio reports that approximately 7,100 counterterrorism missions have been conducted in Afghanistan in the past six months, killing or capturing more than 600 insurgent leaders, killing more than 2,000 enemy fighters, and capturing over 4,100 fighters.
This is good news, and contrary to General James Cartwright's assertion later in the article, is not indicative of a rebalancing toward a CT strategy in Afghanistan. According to Bob Woodward in "Obama's Wars," Cartwright was one of the leading advocates of a pure CT strategy and opponent of a troop surge to support a counterinsurgey strategy in Afghanistan.
But in reality, a central part of any COIN strategy is to kill/capture the irreconcilables in the enemy camp so that the people will feel secure, to create breathing space for economic and political development, and to convince the less-committed guerrillas that maybe it is in their best interest to reintegrate into society lest they be in the crosshairs next.
The kinetic operations Roggio describes are thus perfectly compatible with a broader COIN effort, and General Cartwright (whom I respect greatly) is likely spinning towards his preferred strategy.
This is good news, and contrary to General James Cartwright's assertion later in the article, is not indicative of a rebalancing toward a CT strategy in Afghanistan. According to Bob Woodward in "Obama's Wars," Cartwright was one of the leading advocates of a pure CT strategy and opponent of a troop surge to support a counterinsurgey strategy in Afghanistan.
But in reality, a central part of any COIN strategy is to kill/capture the irreconcilables in the enemy camp so that the people will feel secure, to create breathing space for economic and political development, and to convince the less-committed guerrillas that maybe it is in their best interest to reintegrate into society lest they be in the crosshairs next.
The kinetic operations Roggio describes are thus perfectly compatible with a broader COIN effort, and General Cartwright (whom I respect greatly) is likely spinning towards his preferred strategy.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)