[SEE CAVEAT BELOW REGARDING THE REPUBLISHING OF THIS POST ON THE CORRECT DATE IN JANUARY]
After the near-disaster at Quilali, the Marines pursuing Sandino once again changed tactics and laid aside the plan to assault El Chipote with a combined infantry-air assault. Instead, aggressive patrolling would force the enemy to concentrate in the mountain redoubt, planes would destroy the fortress from the air, and the infantry would mop up the remaining resistance. This plan was feasible because the creaky old DeHavilands had been replaced by new Vought Corsairs and Curtiss Falcons, which had greater bomb-carrying capacities and were faster and more maneuverable. Major Rusty Rowell’s squadron subjected the shacks atop El Chipote to unrelenting bombardment.
On January 14 the airmen flew northeast from Managua through heavy cumulus clouds, their planes laden with 50-pound demolition and 17-pound fragmentation bombs. Luckily, “there was a nice hole in the clouds right over the bandit mountain.” On Rowell’s signal, the planes hurtled towards El Chipote in almost vertical dives. “They saw us coming,” Rowell recalled. “The first thing I saw was a barrage of sky rockets. Eight or ten of them rose in the sector that I was after.” In all, 2,800 rounds of machine-gun ammunition ripped into the hilltop, while four 50-pound and 18 17-pound bombs burst upon Sandino’s entrenchments. One of Rowell’s aviators scored a direct hit with a 50-pound bomb on a building. After the bomb burst, about 40 people ran from a nearby house and the plane dropped another bomb, making a direct hit in the center of the group. The aviators estimated that 45-50 bodies were scattered on the ground after the attack. Following the air assault, rumors of Sandino’s death received wide circulation. On January 19, Rowell flew over the mountain and saw nothing but “squadrons of vultures.”
However, much like the campaign to bomb Osama bin Laden out of Tora Bora 73 years later, the reliance on air power to kill a targeted individual would ultimately prove unsuccessful.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Monday, December 13, 2010
Interesting story in Newsweek on Israel's history of eliminating foreign weapons scientists.
Technically speaking, these killings were neither strategic manhunts or targeted killings/decapitation, but rather pure assassination. Roughly speaking, strategic manhunts involve the deployment of uniformed forces with the objective of capturing/killing one individual. Targeted killings/decapitation strategies involve killing a class of individuals during a time of war, i.e. the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, Israel's targeting of Hamas cell leaders during the Second Intifada, or U.S. targeting of al-Qa'ida in Iraq/Jaish al-Mahdi leadership in Iraq or Predator strikes against al-Qa'ida/Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Conversely, although assassinations are directed at individuals, unlike strategic manhunts by definition they exclude the possibility of capture. Additionally, whereas targeted killings use overt military force, the essence of assassination is its treacherous nature, which includes the use of violent force during peacetime by covert personnel.
But still, it is an interesting article, and demonstrates: a) how little Israel's strategic situation has improved in the last 50 years; and b) that existential threats to its security existed well before the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.
Technically speaking, these killings were neither strategic manhunts or targeted killings/decapitation, but rather pure assassination. Roughly speaking, strategic manhunts involve the deployment of uniformed forces with the objective of capturing/killing one individual. Targeted killings/decapitation strategies involve killing a class of individuals during a time of war, i.e. the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, Israel's targeting of Hamas cell leaders during the Second Intifada, or U.S. targeting of al-Qa'ida in Iraq/Jaish al-Mahdi leadership in Iraq or Predator strikes against al-Qa'ida/Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Conversely, although assassinations are directed at individuals, unlike strategic manhunts by definition they exclude the possibility of capture. Additionally, whereas targeted killings use overt military force, the essence of assassination is its treacherous nature, which includes the use of violent force during peacetime by covert personnel.
But still, it is an interesting article, and demonstrates: a) how little Israel's strategic situation has improved in the last 50 years; and b) that existential threats to its security existed well before the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.
Saturday, December 11, 2010
Today in Manhunting History -- January 11, 1886: The Death of Captain Emmet Crawford
A heavy fog sat upon Captain Emmet Crawford’s camp on the morning of January 11, 1886.
The day before, after a forced march of 48 hours through the mountain range known to Mexicans as “Espina del Diablo,” or “Backbone of the Devil, Crawford and the 100 Apache scouts he led had surprised Geronimo and his warriors at their camp along the Aros River, 150 miles south of the U.S. border. Just before daylight his detachment attacked and drove Geronimo’s followers from their rancheria. The capture of Geronimo’s supplies was a terrible blow in the harsh winter conditions of the Sierra Madres, and toward the middle of the afternoon, a squaw came into the camp and said that Geronimo and his followers were camped a few miles away and wished to talk to Crawford about surrendering. Crawford agreed to meet with Geronimo, and everyone in the American camp seemed to collectively exhale, believing the Geronimo campaign was about to end.
Six-foot-one, with gray eyes, a fellow officer described Crawford, saying: “Mentally, morally, and physically he would have been an ideal knight of King Arthur’s Court.” The Apaches alternately called him “Tall Chief” because of his height, and “Captain Coffee” because of his apparent addiction to the beverage. When reenlisting scouts in October and November for the expedition, Crawford chose only White Mountain and friendly Chiricahua Apaches – mountain Indians whom he knew were ideally suited for the arduous task of trailing Geronimo in the difficult Sierra Madres. These Indians joined the expedition not only because they hated the renegades, but also because they trusted Crawford, who was known for his concern for the scouts serving under him.
Just as the light of dawn made the terrain around Crawford’s camp visible on the 11th, the sentries reported a large body of troops approaching. One scout, believing the oncoming party to be Major Wirt Davis and his scouts, called to the approaching force in Apache.
But they were not Apache scouts.
At the sound of Apache voices, the force of 150 Mexican irregulars opened fire on Crawford’s camp. Bullets hissed through the air, driving the officers and scouts into the rocks for cover. Crawford ordered his men to hold their fire while he and the other officers shouted in Spanish, identifying themselves as American soldiers and waving handkerchiefs. After about 15 minutes there was a lull in the shooting. Crawford climbed atop a prominent rock in plain view of the Mexicans. Although his blue field uniform was in tatters, his brown beard ensured that he looked nothing like an Apache. Waving a handkerchief in each hand, he shouted: “No tiro! No tiro! Soldados Americanos!”
Twenty-five yards away, across a small ravine, a Mexican steadied his rifle against a pine tree and took aim. A shot rang out. Lieutenant Marion P. Maus, Crawford’s second-in-command, turned and “saw the Captain lying on the rocks with a wound in his head, and some of his brains lying upon the rocks.”
Enraged, the immediately unleashed a furious fire upon the Nacionales. The battle raged for an hour as the Apaches and Mexicans blazed away at one another, while Crawford lay bleeding in the no-man’s-land between the combatants. Finally, the Mexicans raised their own white flag. Four on the American side were wounded, while the scouts killed four Mexicans and wounded five others. Crawford lingered in a coma for seven excruciating days, finally dying on January 18. General George Crook maintained that had Crawford lived, the Apache War would have ended there beside the Aros River in January 1886.
On a hillside across the river, the renegades sat and watched the battle rage. A member of the band still recalled 70 years later how “Geronimo watched it and laughed.”
The day before, after a forced march of 48 hours through the mountain range known to Mexicans as “Espina del Diablo,” or “Backbone of the Devil, Crawford and the 100 Apache scouts he led had surprised Geronimo and his warriors at their camp along the Aros River, 150 miles south of the U.S. border. Just before daylight his detachment attacked and drove Geronimo’s followers from their rancheria. The capture of Geronimo’s supplies was a terrible blow in the harsh winter conditions of the Sierra Madres, and toward the middle of the afternoon, a squaw came into the camp and said that Geronimo and his followers were camped a few miles away and wished to talk to Crawford about surrendering. Crawford agreed to meet with Geronimo, and everyone in the American camp seemed to collectively exhale, believing the Geronimo campaign was about to end.
Six-foot-one, with gray eyes, a fellow officer described Crawford, saying: “Mentally, morally, and physically he would have been an ideal knight of King Arthur’s Court.” The Apaches alternately called him “Tall Chief” because of his height, and “Captain Coffee” because of his apparent addiction to the beverage. When reenlisting scouts in October and November for the expedition, Crawford chose only White Mountain and friendly Chiricahua Apaches – mountain Indians whom he knew were ideally suited for the arduous task of trailing Geronimo in the difficult Sierra Madres. These Indians joined the expedition not only because they hated the renegades, but also because they trusted Crawford, who was known for his concern for the scouts serving under him.
Just as the light of dawn made the terrain around Crawford’s camp visible on the 11th, the sentries reported a large body of troops approaching. One scout, believing the oncoming party to be Major Wirt Davis and his scouts, called to the approaching force in Apache.
But they were not Apache scouts.
At the sound of Apache voices, the force of 150 Mexican irregulars opened fire on Crawford’s camp. Bullets hissed through the air, driving the officers and scouts into the rocks for cover. Crawford ordered his men to hold their fire while he and the other officers shouted in Spanish, identifying themselves as American soldiers and waving handkerchiefs. After about 15 minutes there was a lull in the shooting. Crawford climbed atop a prominent rock in plain view of the Mexicans. Although his blue field uniform was in tatters, his brown beard ensured that he looked nothing like an Apache. Waving a handkerchief in each hand, he shouted: “No tiro! No tiro! Soldados Americanos!”
Twenty-five yards away, across a small ravine, a Mexican steadied his rifle against a pine tree and took aim. A shot rang out. Lieutenant Marion P. Maus, Crawford’s second-in-command, turned and “saw the Captain lying on the rocks with a wound in his head, and some of his brains lying upon the rocks.”
Enraged, the immediately unleashed a furious fire upon the Nacionales. The battle raged for an hour as the Apaches and Mexicans blazed away at one another, while Crawford lay bleeding in the no-man’s-land between the combatants. Finally, the Mexicans raised their own white flag. Four on the American side were wounded, while the scouts killed four Mexicans and wounded five others. Crawford lingered in a coma for seven excruciating days, finally dying on January 18. General George Crook maintained that had Crawford lived, the Apache War would have ended there beside the Aros River in January 1886.
On a hillside across the river, the renegades sat and watched the battle rage. A member of the band still recalled 70 years later how “Geronimo watched it and laughed.”
Friday, December 10, 2010
Today in Manhunting History -- January 10, 1916: Massacre at Santa Ysabel
On January 10, 1916, forces belonging to Mexican revolutionary/bandit Pancho Villa stopped a train of the Mexican North Western Railway Company near Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua. They dragged 17 American miners off the train, and amid cries of “Viva Villa,” they stripped and shot the Americans in cold blood. According to Woodrow Wilson's biographer Arthur S. Link, news of the massacre “set off violent agitation in Congress,” and a “wild anger and excitement greater than any since the sinking of the Lusitania surged through part of the American people.”
Despite calls for retaliation, the Wilson administration insisted it was an internal matter for Mexican President Venustiano Carranza to deal with. Less than two months later, however, Villa's next attack would make him the target of a U.S. strategic manhunt.
Despite calls for retaliation, the Wilson administration insisted it was an internal matter for Mexican President Venustiano Carranza to deal with. Less than two months later, however, Villa's next attack would make him the target of a U.S. strategic manhunt.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Yon on the Danger of Social Networking
Michael Yon on how social networking can make you easy to target. (Or as Glenn Reynolds titles his link, "How to Get Tracked Down and Killed."
Unfortunately, the targets of most recent U.S. strategic manhunts have already learned this lesson. Bin Laden’s “voice-print” was on file in the NSA’s massive computers, and satellites scanned cellular and satellite phone calls originating from Afghanistan in the 1990s for a match. Yet these technologies were rendered useless when bin Laden stopped using these devices in 1998, relying exclusively on face-to-face meetings and couriers to transmit orders to his minions.
Saddam and his sons were extremely careful not to use phones or other communications equipment that might give their positions away. Other than the single phone call intercepted during the raid that killed his sons, there were reportedly few, if any, direct intercepts of Saddam available. Similarly, Zarqawi “knew well how much the Americans relied on high technology to track down suspects: he and his men refrained from using cell phones, knowing how easily they could be tracked.”
Even Pablo Escobar warned his son "Stay away from the phone. The phone is death," advice he ignored himself to his detriment.
Unfortunately, the targets of most recent U.S. strategic manhunts have already learned this lesson. Bin Laden’s “voice-print” was on file in the NSA’s massive computers, and satellites scanned cellular and satellite phone calls originating from Afghanistan in the 1990s for a match. Yet these technologies were rendered useless when bin Laden stopped using these devices in 1998, relying exclusively on face-to-face meetings and couriers to transmit orders to his minions.
Saddam and his sons were extremely careful not to use phones or other communications equipment that might give their positions away. Other than the single phone call intercepted during the raid that killed his sons, there were reportedly few, if any, direct intercepts of Saddam available. Similarly, Zarqawi “knew well how much the Americans relied on high technology to track down suspects: he and his men refrained from using cell phones, knowing how easily they could be tracked.”
Even Pablo Escobar warned his son "Stay away from the phone. The phone is death," advice he ignored himself to his detriment.
David Bosco on Targeted Killings
Two pieces by my friend David Bosco on the implications of targeted killings over at his Foreign Policy blog "The Multilateralist." (David wrote an excellent book on the history of the UN Security Council, Five to Rule Them All, so has a longstanding interest in these issues).
Normally, I am skeptical about attempts to restrain the struggle against al Qa'ida through litigation or the articulation of international norms that states will just ignore at their convenience. But David raises some interesting points about how the United States will respond if a foreign power someday decides to target somebody they have designated as a terrorist on U.S. soil.
Normally, I am skeptical about attempts to restrain the struggle against al Qa'ida through litigation or the articulation of international norms that states will just ignore at their convenience. But David raises some interesting points about how the United States will respond if a foreign power someday decides to target somebody they have designated as a terrorist on U.S. soil.
SOF Deals Blow to Taliban Ranks
The invaluable Bill Roggio on special operations raids in Afghanistan. Roggio reports that approximately 7,100 counterterrorism missions have been conducted in Afghanistan in the past six months, killing or capturing more than 600 insurgent leaders, killing more than 2,000 enemy fighters, and capturing over 4,100 fighters.
This is good news, and contrary to General James Cartwright's assertion later in the article, is not indicative of a rebalancing toward a CT strategy in Afghanistan. According to Bob Woodward in "Obama's Wars," Cartwright was one of the leading advocates of a pure CT strategy and opponent of a troop surge to support a counterinsurgey strategy in Afghanistan.
But in reality, a central part of any COIN strategy is to kill/capture the irreconcilables in the enemy camp so that the people will feel secure, to create breathing space for economic and political development, and to convince the less-committed guerrillas that maybe it is in their best interest to reintegrate into society lest they be in the crosshairs next.
The kinetic operations Roggio describes are thus perfectly compatible with a broader COIN effort, and General Cartwright (whom I respect greatly) is likely spinning towards his preferred strategy.
This is good news, and contrary to General James Cartwright's assertion later in the article, is not indicative of a rebalancing toward a CT strategy in Afghanistan. According to Bob Woodward in "Obama's Wars," Cartwright was one of the leading advocates of a pure CT strategy and opponent of a troop surge to support a counterinsurgey strategy in Afghanistan.
But in reality, a central part of any COIN strategy is to kill/capture the irreconcilables in the enemy camp so that the people will feel secure, to create breathing space for economic and political development, and to convince the less-committed guerrillas that maybe it is in their best interest to reintegrate into society lest they be in the crosshairs next.
The kinetic operations Roggio describes are thus perfectly compatible with a broader COIN effort, and General Cartwright (whom I respect greatly) is likely spinning towards his preferred strategy.
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Awlaki Lawsuit Dismissed
Yesterday a judge dismissed Anwar al-Awlaki's father's lawsuit to block the United States from targeting the U.S-born cleric now affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
I'm not a lawyer, and won't pretend to be able to say what this means regarding the legality of America's Drone War against al-Qaeda. Fortunately, American University law professor Kenneth Anderson is an expert on these issues, and comments on the decision at The Volokh Conspiracy.
I'm not a lawyer, and won't pretend to be able to say what this means regarding the legality of America's Drone War against al-Qaeda. Fortunately, American University law professor Kenneth Anderson is an expert on these issues, and comments on the decision at The Volokh Conspiracy.
Monday, December 6, 2010
Today in Manhunting History -- January 6, 1928
Before there was Mogadishu, there was Quilali. And before there was the incredible heroism of Delta Force snipers Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randy Shugart, there was the courage of Marine aviator First Lieutenant Christian F. Schilt.
As the approximately 400-man Sandinista force laid siege to Quilali, the Marines were in a difficult situation. They were low on ammunition and supplies, and of 174 officers and men, eight were dead, and 31 wounded – including every surviving officer. The Marines and Guardia quickly constructed an airfield in the middle of Quilali, an overgrown and abandoned hamlet that was little more than “an aggregation of shacks” near the Jicaro River. Flying a Vought 02U-1 “Corsair” biplane, 1LT Schilt made 10 landings and takeoffs on Quilali’s main street from January 6-8. Under heavy enemy fire, Schilt delivered 1,400 pounds of medicine and supplies and evacuated 18 wounded. Each time Schilt’s Corsair touched down Marines had to run out and grab the wings in order to slow the brakeless plane down and keep it from smashing off the end of the abbreviated runway.
Although the Marine ground offensive was a failure, Schilt was awarded the Medal of Honor for these daring flights.
As the approximately 400-man Sandinista force laid siege to Quilali, the Marines were in a difficult situation. They were low on ammunition and supplies, and of 174 officers and men, eight were dead, and 31 wounded – including every surviving officer. The Marines and Guardia quickly constructed an airfield in the middle of Quilali, an overgrown and abandoned hamlet that was little more than “an aggregation of shacks” near the Jicaro River. Flying a Vought 02U-1 “Corsair” biplane, 1LT Schilt made 10 landings and takeoffs on Quilali’s main street from January 6-8. Under heavy enemy fire, Schilt delivered 1,400 pounds of medicine and supplies and evacuated 18 wounded. Each time Schilt’s Corsair touched down Marines had to run out and grab the wings in order to slow the brakeless plane down and keep it from smashing off the end of the abbreviated runway.
Although the Marine ground offensive was a failure, Schilt was awarded the Medal of Honor for these daring flights.
Sunday, December 5, 2010
Bergen on Bin Laden in Vanity Fair
A new Peter Bergen piece on Osama bin Laden in January's Vanity Fair.
Bergen takes a backseat to no one in his expertise on bin Laden, but I think he holds two slightly paradoxical beliefs. In a September Newsweek article, Bergen wrote: "Bin Laden remains important as the guiding icon that is drawing these people to jihad." Yet he also observes in his new piece that al-Qaeda's "assets are few, and shrinking." He says this is because al-Qaeda's ideology will eventually sow the seeds of its own destruction absent U.S./Western overreaction.
If the former is true, then killing bin Laden is critical. If the latter is reality, than kinetic action and the collateral damage it produces actually prolongs al-Qaeda's existence.
For my money, I think bin Laden's personal significance is overstated. As Bergen's title ("Bin Laden's Lonely Crusade") implies, bin Laden is like a general without an army. He is not able to communicate or direct al-Qaeda's operations, yet because his ideology has gone viral, he does not need to be alive to inspire extremists. Thus, killing him will not "defeat" al-Qaeda.
This is not to say the United States should stop devoting military and intelligence assets to hunting Osama bin Laden.
Our persistence in targeting Bin Laden has resulted in the deaths of numerous secondary al Qaeda leaders. Their removal has weakened the organization's ability to execute terrorist attacks. Also, simple justice demands that Bin Laden, Ayman al- Zawahiri and other al Qaeda leaders be brought to account for the murder of more than 3,000 Americans and countless other civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
(To be fair, Bergen does not believe U.S. policy should be completely passive. He writes: "Containment, when it comes to al-Qaeda, means putting continual pressure on the group's safe havens, in particular in Pakistan, but also in Yemen, in Somalia, and anywhere else that seems poised to become a base. Doing so does not require invasion or total war. It requires only quick attacks and covert insertions that keep terrorists from becoming settled or secure.")
Bergen takes a backseat to no one in his expertise on bin Laden, but I think he holds two slightly paradoxical beliefs. In a September Newsweek article, Bergen wrote: "Bin Laden remains important as the guiding icon that is drawing these people to jihad." Yet he also observes in his new piece that al-Qaeda's "assets are few, and shrinking." He says this is because al-Qaeda's ideology will eventually sow the seeds of its own destruction absent U.S./Western overreaction.
If the former is true, then killing bin Laden is critical. If the latter is reality, than kinetic action and the collateral damage it produces actually prolongs al-Qaeda's existence.
For my money, I think bin Laden's personal significance is overstated. As Bergen's title ("Bin Laden's Lonely Crusade") implies, bin Laden is like a general without an army. He is not able to communicate or direct al-Qaeda's operations, yet because his ideology has gone viral, he does not need to be alive to inspire extremists. Thus, killing him will not "defeat" al-Qaeda.
This is not to say the United States should stop devoting military and intelligence assets to hunting Osama bin Laden.
Our persistence in targeting Bin Laden has resulted in the deaths of numerous secondary al Qaeda leaders. Their removal has weakened the organization's ability to execute terrorist attacks. Also, simple justice demands that Bin Laden, Ayman al- Zawahiri and other al Qaeda leaders be brought to account for the murder of more than 3,000 Americans and countless other civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
(To be fair, Bergen does not believe U.S. policy should be completely passive. He writes: "Containment, when it comes to al-Qaeda, means putting continual pressure on the group's safe havens, in particular in Pakistan, but also in Yemen, in Somalia, and anywhere else that seems poised to become a base. Doing so does not require invasion or total war. It requires only quick attacks and covert insertions that keep terrorists from becoming settled or secure.")
Saturday, December 4, 2010
Washington Post Editorial on "Fair Game"
Slightly off-topic (hey, I made it three days!), but worth republishing in its entirety is the Washington Post Editorial condemning the gross historical inaccuracies contained in the movie "Fair Game."
Hollywood myth-making on Valerie Plame controversy
Friday, December 3, 2010; 8:54 PM
WE'RE NOT in the habit of writing movie reviews. But the recently released film "Fair Game" - which covers a poisonous Washington controversy during the war in Iraq - deserves some editorial page comment, if only because of what its promoters are saying about it. The protagonists portrayed in the movie, former diplomat Joseph C. Wilson IV and former spy Valerie Plame, claim that it tells the true story of their battle with the Bush administration over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and Ms. Plame's exposure as a CIA agent. "It's accurate," Ms. Plame told The Post. Said Mr. Wilson: "For people who have short memories or don't read, this is the only way they will remember that period."
We certainly hope that is not the case. In fact, "Fair Game," based on books by Mr. Wilson and his wife, is full of distortions - not to mention outright inventions. To start with the most sensational: The movie portrays Ms. Plame as having cultivated a group of Iraqi scientists and arranged for them to leave the country, and it suggests that once her cover was blown, the operation was aborted and the scientists were abandoned. This is simply false. In reality, as The Post's Walter Pincus and Richard Leiby reported, Ms. Plame did not work directly on the program, and it was not shut down because of her identification.
The movie portrays Mr. Wilson as a whistle-blower who debunked a Bush administration claim that Iraq had tried to purchase uranium from the African country of Niger. In fact, an investigation by the Senate intelligence committee found that Mr. Wilson's reporting did not affect the intelligence community's view on the matter, and an official British investigation found that President George W. Bush's statement in a State of the Union address that Britain believed that Iraq had sought uranium in Niger was well-founded.
"Fair Game" also resells the couple's story that Ms. Plame's exposure was the result of a White House conspiracy. A lengthy and wasteful investigation by a special prosecutor found no such conspiracy - but it did confirm that the prime source of a newspaper column identifying Ms. Plame was a State Department official, not a White House political operative.
Hollywood has a habit of making movies about historical events without regard for the truth; "Fair Game" is just one more example. But the film's reception illustrates a more troubling trend of political debates in Washington in which established facts are willfully ignored. Mr. Wilson claimed that he had proved that Mr. Bush deliberately twisted the truth about Iraq, and he was eagerly embraced by those who insist the former president lied the country into a war. Though it was long ago established that Mr. Wilson himself was not telling the truth - not about his mission to Niger and not about his wife - the myth endures. We'll join the former president in hoping that future historians get it right.
German Parliamentarian: Obama "kills people as he sees fit"
Der Spiegel reports on the controversy in Germany over U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, particularly an October 4 strike that killed a German citizen of Turkish extraction in Waziristan. One member of the Bundestag said: "Barack Obama is not God, able to freely decide about life and death," he says. "Nevertheless he behaves like an Old Testament God who kills people as he sees fit with fire and brimstone."
It is an understatement to say that Conservatives have many problems with the current Administration's policies. But to his credit, President Obama has stayed on the offensive against al Qa'ida. Unlike those who sided with European leftists in labeling President Bush a war criminal, all Americans should strongly condemn such ridiculous statements about an American president.
It is an understatement to say that Conservatives have many problems with the current Administration's policies. But to his credit, President Obama has stayed on the offensive against al Qa'ida. Unlike those who sided with European leftists in labeling President Bush a war criminal, all Americans should strongly condemn such ridiculous statements about an American president.
Friday, December 3, 2010
Capture or Kill Operations in Mexico
The Washington Post reports on the DEA's cooperation with Mexican marines on capture/kill operations against Mexican drug lords.
History shows that strategic manhunts or decapitation campaigns are more likely to be successful if they utilize indigenous forces. Also, the national security threat posed by the rise of a putative narco-state in northern Mexico has not typically been understated because of political correctness attendant to the debate regarding immigration reform in the United States.
History shows that strategic manhunts or decapitation campaigns are more likely to be successful if they utilize indigenous forces. Also, the national security threat posed by the rise of a putative narco-state in northern Mexico has not typically been understated because of political correctness attendant to the debate regarding immigration reform in the United States.
Today in Manhunting History -- Jan 3, 1990: Prisoner # 41586
[PLEASE NOTE THIS BLOG IS STILL IN A BETA PHASE. THIS POST WILL BE REPUBLISHED ON THE CORRECT DATE NEXT MONTH]
Two weeks after American paratroopers had filled the night sky over Panama, General Manuel Noriega had run out of options. Since the start of Operation Just Cause, Noriega had been on the run from more than 20,000 U.S. forces hunting for the dictator. Since Christmas Eve, he had received asylum at the Papal Nuciature in Panama City, occupying the same bare bedroom with no air-conditioning and a broken television set in which so many of his victims had sought refuge. After a week spent receiving reports of his loyalists' surrenders throughout the country and hearing the taunts of Panamanian mobs outside the Vatican's Embassy, Noriega finally agreed with Monsignor Jose Sebastian Laboa that surrender was his best option. ("Do you really want to spend the rest of your life having nuns wash your underwear?" the wily priest asked).
Just before 9PM, January 3, Noriega emerged from the Nunciature wearing a wrinkled tan uniform with four stars on each shoulder board. Carrying a Bible and a toothbrush, he looked stunned and submissive in the glare of the television camera lights. He was met at the gate by Major General Marc Cisneros, Commander of the U.S. Army South.
“Yo soy el General Noriega. Me rindo a las fuerza de los Estados Unidos.” (I am General Noriega, and I am surrendering to U.S. forces).
“Su rendicion es aceptada.” (Your surrender is accepted).
The ex-dictator was quickly seized by Delta Force operators and hustled aboard a helicopter. Minutes later, at Howard Air Force Base, he was formally placed under arrest by DEA agents and read his Miranda rights in Spanish. The agents made him trade his uniform for a prisoner’s flight suit and escorted him aboard a C-130. Within two hours the man who had controlled a tropical paradise as the “Maximum Leader” was on the ground in the United States, heading to a Miami jail cell as Prisoner #41586.
Ironically, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment pilot who flew the Blackhawk helicopter from the Nunciature to Howard Air Force Base was Chief Warrant Officer Cliff Wolcott, who would three years later would play a critical, yet tragic role, in America's hunt for Muhammad Farah Aideed.
Two weeks after American paratroopers had filled the night sky over Panama, General Manuel Noriega had run out of options. Since the start of Operation Just Cause, Noriega had been on the run from more than 20,000 U.S. forces hunting for the dictator. Since Christmas Eve, he had received asylum at the Papal Nuciature in Panama City, occupying the same bare bedroom with no air-conditioning and a broken television set in which so many of his victims had sought refuge. After a week spent receiving reports of his loyalists' surrenders throughout the country and hearing the taunts of Panamanian mobs outside the Vatican's Embassy, Noriega finally agreed with Monsignor Jose Sebastian Laboa that surrender was his best option. ("Do you really want to spend the rest of your life having nuns wash your underwear?" the wily priest asked).
Just before 9PM, January 3, Noriega emerged from the Nunciature wearing a wrinkled tan uniform with four stars on each shoulder board. Carrying a Bible and a toothbrush, he looked stunned and submissive in the glare of the television camera lights. He was met at the gate by Major General Marc Cisneros, Commander of the U.S. Army South.
“Yo soy el General Noriega. Me rindo a las fuerza de los Estados Unidos.” (I am General Noriega, and I am surrendering to U.S. forces).
“Su rendicion es aceptada.” (Your surrender is accepted).
The ex-dictator was quickly seized by Delta Force operators and hustled aboard a helicopter. Minutes later, at Howard Air Force Base, he was formally placed under arrest by DEA agents and read his Miranda rights in Spanish. The agents made him trade his uniform for a prisoner’s flight suit and escorted him aboard a C-130. Within two hours the man who had controlled a tropical paradise as the “Maximum Leader” was on the ground in the United States, heading to a Miami jail cell as Prisoner #41586.
Ironically, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment pilot who flew the Blackhawk helicopter from the Nunciature to Howard Air Force Base was Chief Warrant Officer Cliff Wolcott, who would three years later would play a critical, yet tragic role, in America's hunt for Muhammad Farah Aideed.
Thursday, December 2, 2010
AP: Reduction in Special Operations Raids in Iraq
The AP reports on the reduction in special operations raids in Iraq.
Someday, a great book could be written about the Joint Special Operations Command's war in Iraq. My book covers these operators' hunts for Saddam Hussein and Musab al-Zarqawi, but JSOC forces captured or killed hundreds of al-Qa'ida in Iraq and Jaish al-Mahdi cell leaders in an effort to decapitate Iraq's various insurgencies. Part of the reason for the operations slowdown described above is that our SOF were so successful in targeting these terrorists.
Unfortunately (although understandably), most of that vital campaign will forever remain behind a wall of secrecy. But it would make one hell of a story if it were ever told.
Someday, a great book could be written about the Joint Special Operations Command's war in Iraq. My book covers these operators' hunts for Saddam Hussein and Musab al-Zarqawi, but JSOC forces captured or killed hundreds of al-Qa'ida in Iraq and Jaish al-Mahdi cell leaders in an effort to decapitate Iraq's various insurgencies. Part of the reason for the operations slowdown described above is that our SOF were so successful in targeting these terrorists.
Unfortunately (although understandably), most of that vital campaign will forever remain behind a wall of secrecy. But it would make one hell of a story if it were ever told.
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
Tajikstan: The Next Jihadi Stronghold?
An interesting piece by Ahmed Rashid on Tajikstan: The Next Jihadi Stronghold?. It is a situation that merits scrutiny, especially if we begin to see al-Qa'ida operatives beginning to migrate there to avoid Predator strikes in Pakistan.
Pakistani Government Supported Predator Strikes
CNN reports the less-than-startling news that Pakistan's government approved U.S. Predator attacks to kill al-Qa'ida and Taliban targets in Pakistan.
Most of the Wikileaks material is merely old news or simply the embarrassing revelation of diplomatic indiscretion. However, it will be a significant blow to our national security if the quiet partnerships upon which prosecuting the War on Terror depends are undermined because the Wikileaks' revelations makes such cooperation with the United States politically untenable for partner nations such as Pakistan and Yemen.
Most of the Wikileaks material is merely old news or simply the embarrassing revelation of diplomatic indiscretion. However, it will be a significant blow to our national security if the quiet partnerships upon which prosecuting the War on Terror depends are undermined because the Wikileaks' revelations makes such cooperation with the United States politically untenable for partner nations such as Pakistan and Yemen.
Today in Manhunting History -- Jan 1, 1928: Sandino's Hunters Become the Prey
[NOTE TO ANYBODY STUMBLING UPON THIS POST: THIS BLOG IS STILL IN BETA FORM, SO THIS POST WILL BE REPUBLISHED ON THE CORRECT DATE NEXT MONTH . . . SORRY FOR ANY CONFUSION]
Sixty-five years before Somalia and "The Battle of Mogadishu," there was Nicaragua and "The Battle of Quilali."
Like Somalia, U.S. forces were deployed in an attempt to capture or kill one man, only instead of U.S. special operations forces hunting the Somali warlord Muhammad Farrah Aideed, in 1928 it was U.S. Marines pursuing the Nicaraguan guerrilla Augusto Sandino. The Marines had discovered the location of Sandino's mountain fortress "El Chipote" and dispatched two large combat patrols totaling 200 men to seize the insurgent's hideout and capture Sandino.
But as with the mission depicted in the book and movie "Black Hawk Down," the U.S. hunters quickly became the hunted. Two days earlier 400 Sandinistas ambushed a force of 114 Marines and Nicaraguan Guardia a mile outside Quilali. Five Marines and two Guardia were killed, and 23 Marines and two guardsmen were wounded. The column collected its dead and wounded and limped into Quilali.
On January 1 the Sandinistas struck the second patrol – 40 Marines and 20 Guardia under First Lieutenant Merton A. Richal – six miles north of Quilali. First Lieutenant Richard Bruce, who had recently written his mother promising to hold Sandino’s head in his hands or perish “like a dog,” was on point and was the first Marine killed in an avalanche of dynamite bombs and machine gun fire. Bruce’s assailants fell upon his lifeless body and savagely mutilated it with their machetes. The survivors of the initial assault rallied, but had to be rescued by a relief patrol from Quilali. Richal’s column fell back on the village and joined forces with Livingston’s patrol.
Sixty-five years before Somalia and "The Battle of Mogadishu," there was Nicaragua and "The Battle of Quilali."
Like Somalia, U.S. forces were deployed in an attempt to capture or kill one man, only instead of U.S. special operations forces hunting the Somali warlord Muhammad Farrah Aideed, in 1928 it was U.S. Marines pursuing the Nicaraguan guerrilla Augusto Sandino. The Marines had discovered the location of Sandino's mountain fortress "El Chipote" and dispatched two large combat patrols totaling 200 men to seize the insurgent's hideout and capture Sandino.
But as with the mission depicted in the book and movie "Black Hawk Down," the U.S. hunters quickly became the hunted. Two days earlier 400 Sandinistas ambushed a force of 114 Marines and Nicaraguan Guardia a mile outside Quilali. Five Marines and two Guardia were killed, and 23 Marines and two guardsmen were wounded. The column collected its dead and wounded and limped into Quilali.
On January 1 the Sandinistas struck the second patrol – 40 Marines and 20 Guardia under First Lieutenant Merton A. Richal – six miles north of Quilali. First Lieutenant Richard Bruce, who had recently written his mother promising to hold Sandino’s head in his hands or perish “like a dog,” was on point and was the first Marine killed in an avalanche of dynamite bombs and machine gun fire. Bruce’s assailants fell upon his lifeless body and savagely mutilated it with their machetes. The survivors of the initial assault rallied, but had to be rescued by a relief patrol from Quilali. Richal’s column fell back on the village and joined forces with Livingston’s patrol.
Like the elements of Task Force Ranger pinned down overnight in Mogadishu, the Marines were in a difficult situation as the 400 Sandinistas laid siege to Quilali. They were outnumbered, low on ammunition and supplies, and of 174 officers and men, eight were dead, and 31 wounded – including every surviving officer.
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